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STUMP ON LIBERTARIANISM AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Stewart Goetz

Eleonore Stump has argued that a proponent of l:ibertarian freedom must
maintain that an agent is sometimes morally responsible for his mental
action and that such n10ral responsibility is incompatible with that mental
action's being causally determined. Nevertheless, she maintains that this
moral responsibility does not require that the agent be free to perform
another mental action (act otherwise). In this paper, I argue that Stump
fails to make a good case against the view that moral responsibility requires
the freedom to act otherwise.

In a previous article,l I argued that Eleonore Stump had failed to provide a
clear statement of her own view of libertarian freedom, and that her
FrankfLIrt-style counterexample (FSC) for the falsity of tl1e principle of
alternative possibilities (PAP)2 was unsound. In her response to me/
Stump has clarified her view of libertarian freedom which is designed to be
compatible with the falsity of PAP and provided a new argument for
PAP's falsi ty.
In what follows, I will argue that Stump has 110t shown that PAP can be
false and libertarianism true. Her most recent FSC against the truth of PAP
fails because its assumed coherence is questionable. Thus, it is reasonable
for a libertarian to continue to believe the truth of PAP. In addition to
developing a new FSC against PAP, Stump claims that a libertarianism
which asserts the truth of PAP implies the truth of Cartesian dualisn1 and
is, for that reason alone, suspect. I will briefly argue that even if a libertarianism which endorses PAP implies the truth of Cartesian dualism, Stump
has not shown that Cartesian dualism is implausible.
I

According to Stump, there are two species of libertarianism. Both hold
that (1) human beings are sometimes morally responsible for their acts and
(2) moral responsibility for an action is incompatible with that aces being
causally determined. Where the two species differ is with respect to (3)
which asserts that moral responsibility requires alterl1ative possibilities
(PAP). The species of libertarianism which Stump defends denies the truth
of (3) or PAP while the other species affirms PAP.4
PAP has been Llnder sustained attack since Harry Frankfurt's initial
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assault thirty years ago. 5 At the heart of Frankfurt's criticism is the idea
that an agent is morally responsible for the action he actually performs
even though circumstances make it such that he has no alternative to what
he actually does. An agent is morally responsible for what he actually does
because he does it on his own. Frankfurt-style cOLlnterexamples (FSCs) to
PAP are abundant in the literature. The following is a typical FSC which I
set out in my previous article:
FSCI: Black is a nefarious neurosurgeon. In performing an operation
on Jones to remove a brain tUll'lOr, Black inserts a mechanism into
Jones' brain which enables Black to ll'lonitor and control Jones' activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises his
control through a COll'lputer which he has programmed so that,
among other things, it monitors Jones' voting behavior. If Jones
shows an inclination to choose to vote for Carter, then the computer
through the mechanism in Jones' brain intervenes to assure that he
actually chooses to vote for Reagan and does so vote. But if JOI'leS
chooses on his own to vote for Reagan, the computer does nothing
but continues to monitor-without affecting-tl'le goings-on in Jones'
head. Suppose that in the circumstances Jones chooses to vote for
Reagan on his own, just as he would have if Black had not inserted
the mechanism into his head. In this situation, Jones is morally
responsible for choosing to vote for Reagan, even though he could
not have done otherwise.
Recently, David Widerker has pointed out that FSCs such as FSCI beg
the question against the libertarian. 6 Widerker's argument against such
FSCs can be briefly summarized as follows: FSCs presuppose the following principle, or something similar to it:
PI: Jones' showing an inclination to choose to vote for Carter is in the
given circumstances a causally necessary condition of his choosing to
vote for Carter.
If PI were false, says Widerker, then Jones would be free to choose to vote
for Carter without the inclination. With the inclination not being a necessary condition of Jones' choosing to vote for Carter, there would not be
anything to tip off Black about how Jones would choose, and his mechanism could not operate in time to cause Jones to choose to vote for Reagan.
If Jones' showing an inclination to cl'loose to vote for Carter is in the given
circumstances a causally necessary condition of his choosing to vote for
Carter, then his not showing an inclination in the circumstances is causally
sufficient for his not choosing to vote for Carter. In the given circumstances, however, there are only two alternatives, namely, either choosing
to vote for Carter or choosing to vote for Reagan. Therefore, if Jones does
not show an inclination to choose to vote for Carter and thus does not
choose to vote for Carter, then he must choose to vote for Reagan and the
latter choice is causally determined. Thus, Jones' choice to vote for Reagan
is not free and, therefore, he is not responsible for making it. In sl'lort, a
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necessary condition of an FSC's falsifying PAP is that libertarianism be
false. But this just begs the question against libertarians.
Though she admits the intuitive force of Widerker's critique, Stump
nevertheless continues to deny the truth of PAP. Her latest FSC (which I
will call FSC2) begins as follows: Let us assume that what is causally undetermined is Jones' act of will, W, in the actual sequence, where W is a
choice (decision). W must be correlated, and may be identical, with a
neural sequence of events, N/ where N consists, say, of events NI-NL.
Tl1e occurrence of N is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of W, 8
but none of the members of N causes W. 9 Moreover, while the nature of W
may seem to its subject to be simple al1d its occurrence instantaneous, the
complex neural event process N is neither. lO What the indeterministic
nature of W implies with respect to N is that if W is identical with N, then
the first event (NI) in N must be causally undetermined. ll
Stump claims that while it is essential to a libertarian view that W be
undetermined, its being undetermined does 110t guarantee that Jones is
free to will otherwise. In continuing to develop FSC2, she claims that
Widerker's critique of FSCs is dependent upon figures such as Black who
utilize a prior sign (in FSCI, it is an inclinatiol1 to cl100se to vote for Carter)
of an act of will, W*, in the alternate sequence. This sign is a necessary
causal condition of W* which causes W*'s occurrence unless Black, acting
on the sign, preempts the occurrence of W* and hirnself causes W.
According to Stump, however, FSC's don't require such preemption, but
rather they ean be formulated using the eoneept of a prior sign which
serves as a basis for interruption by Black. 12 In FSC2, W* is correlated, and
perhaps identical, with a neural sequence of events N* whose first and last
members are NI* and NL* respectively. As is the case with W, the occurrenee of N* is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of W*, but none
of the members of N* causes W* and W* cannot oceur until all the members of N* have occurred. Therefore, Black can prevent W*, not by being
able to prevent NI*, but by noticing its oecurrence (it funetions as an interruptive sign) and then interrupting or preventing the oceurrence of subsequent events in N*. Because the occurrence of W* requires the occurrence
of all of the members of N*, when events subsequent to NI* in N* are interrupted, W* doesn't occur. Thus, Black is able to guarantee that Jones will
do W, if he doesn't do it on his own, because he (Black) is able to prevent
(by interrupting events in N*) the occurrence of W* and make Jones do W.
Because the feature to which Widerker objects in FSCs such as FSCI, namely, the occurrence of some prior necessary causal condition of W* which
causes W* and serves as a preemptive sign for Black, is not present in
FSC2, we have asound FSC which shows the falsity of PAP and the defensibility of a species of libertarianism which does not require PAP's truth.
11

Contrary to what Stump claims, I believe that FSC2 is no more successful
than other FSC's in undermining the truth of PAP. To understand why,
consider NI-NL and assume that it occurs at time Tl-TL. Now, when
does W, the mental act of choosing to vote for Reagan, occur? Stump says
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that there is "no mental act in an agent unless and until the correlated
sequence of neural firings in that agent's brain is completed."13 This might
be taken to mean that W occurs only at TL. Now, consider the state of the
world at T2. Presllmably, it causally determines that the sequence N3-NL
occur. Does this not imply, then, that the state of the world at T2 causally
determines the occurrence of N? And, given the correlation of N with W,
does this not imply that the state of the world at T2 causally detern1ines the
occurrence of W? Hence, contrary to what Stump claims, W is causally
determined.
One might respond to this argument by maintain.ing tl1at W does not
occur only at TL wl1en NL occurs. Rather, W occurs and is correlated with
the entirety of the temporally extended neural process NI-NL and is completed when NL occurs. If this is the case, however, problems of a different
sort arise. To see why, let us turn to the alternate sequence and W*, which
can be thought of as Jones' choice to vote for Carter. Following Stump's
lead,14 consider the simplest version of FSC2 which is one in wh.ich W* is
identical with N* and where N* is a process consisting of the series of events
NI*-NL*. Because NI* is the beginning of the process, it would seem to be
plausible for a libertarian to claim that what Jones would be responsible for
(were it to occur) is the mental action of his beginning to choose to vote for
Carter. 15 Given that beginning to choose to vote for Carter is identical with
NI*, Black cannot intervene to prevent Jones from beginning to choose to
vote for Carter because on Stump's own account of FSC2, there is no prior
sign wl1ich can be used by Black to preempt Jones from beginning to choose
to vote for Carter. Jones is free to begin to choose to vote otherwise and
FSC2 fails to be a cOLmterexample to PAP. In this case, Stump has (as I suggested in "Stumping for Widerker")16 merely relocated the locus of libertarian freedom (from choice to beginning to choose).
Althoug~ Stump does not discuss this response to her argument, it
seems clear that she is aware of it. Thus, she explicitly states that there is
no mental action or active mental event of beginning to choose to vote:
there is no "mental act of engaging in the begnming of a decision." 17 On
introspective grounds this seems correct: choices seem to be sin1ple mental
actions with no event parts of any kind, and this casts doubt on Stump's
thesis that mental acts can be identical with complex neural processes. 18
Given, however, the assumption that choices are identical with temporally
extended complex neural processes and do not occur only at TL when NL
occurs but from Tl-TL, one wonders how it can be the case that choices
do not have active mental beginnings which agents make or perform. 19 On
this assumption, Stump's denial that such choices have active mel1tal
beginnings seems to have no intuitive bite at all. Rather, the denial appears
to be counterintuitive and thoroughly ad hoc in l1ature in so far as it is made
only in order to undermine PAP.
Given the assumption that W* is identical with and occurs for the entirety of the temporally extended neural process N*, there are at least three
ways to tease out the counterintuitive nature of the denial that NI* is the
beginning of a mental action. First, let us assume for the moment that there
is no counterfactual intervener such as Black. 20 According to Stump, Jones'
choice to vote for Reagan in the actual sequence is undetermined. If it is,
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then it is plausible to claim that Jones is free to begin to choose to vote for
Carter. That is, Jones is free to do or perform NI *, and it is natural to view
NI * as amental act of Jones'. Now, if we reintroduce Black, Stump maintains that he cannot prevent the occurrence of NI *. All he can do is interrupt the neural sequence which is subsequent to NI *. The mere reintroduction of Black, however, is no grounds for thinking that NI * is no longer a
mental action of Jones'. While Black has the power to prevent the occurrence of neural events, he does not have the power to change the ontological status of any of them from actions to non-actions. Thus, to simply stipulate that NI * cannot be the beginning of a ll1ental action when its occurrence
is ul1preventable by Black is thoroughly counterintuitive and ad hoc.
The counterintuitive nature of Stump's stipulation that NI * (or any other
truncated series of neural events in the alternative or actual sequence) is not
an active mental event can be brought out in a second way. This time, consider the actual sequence and the series of neural events NI-NL (Jones'
choice to vote for Reagan). In the present scenario, NI is the initial part of
the cl10ice to vote for Reagan and because it is uncaused that choice is
uncaused (undetermined). What, however, is the explanation for NI's
occurrence? By hypothesis, because it is uncaused, it cannot have a causal
explanation. Given that it is supposedly the initial part of the mental action
of choosing to vote for Reagan, one might be tempted to say that the explanation for its occurrence is tl1e purpose or reason for which Jones chooses to
vote for Reagan. Here, however, matters become confused, if not incoherente On Stump's aCCOl-ffit, NI itself is not active in nature because there is no
mental action of beginning to choose to vote for Reagan. Let us aSSl-lme for
the moment that for whatever reason (e.g., Jones dies or he has a brain
seizure), the neural sequence which begins with NI is truncated before it
reaches completion. For the sake of simplicity, let us aSSLlme it is trUl1cated
immediately after NI occurs. Now, what is the explanation for NI's occurrence? It has no cause, so there is no causal explanation. Moreover, because
it is not active in nature, it is not made by Jones for a reason. In short, its
occurrence is thoroughly inexplicable and random in nature. Let us now
reverse course and assurne that the l1eural sequence is not truncated but is
completed. It would now seem that NI has an explanatiol1, namely, the
reason whicl1 Jones has for choosing to vote for Reagan, because NI is now
part of a choice of Jones'. Thus, whether NI has an explanation depends
upon what 11appens after it has occurred. If we know anything about the
nature of explanations, however, it is that they exist or occur at the same
time as, if not prior to, the events which they explain. No event can occur
al1d then acquire an explanation because certain other events took place
after its occurrence. Thus, stipulating that NI is not itself the active beginning of an action has counterintuitive implications with respect to the issue
of whether or not it has an explanation. Indeed, the assumption that NI is
not itself active in nature seems to entail consequences for its explanation
which are not even coherent.
In defense of Stump's position about the non-active status of NI, I can
conceive of the following response: While it is true tl1at NI is uncaused, it
does not follow from this that if the neural sequence subsequent to it were
truncated, then NI would not have an explanation. After all, many materi-
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al events which are not (parts of) actions have explanations in terms of purposes. For example, consider the motion of a baseball to horne plate. It is
presumably not an action, yet it has an explanation in terms of the pitcher's
purpose, which is to get the batter out. Notice, however, that in a case such
as this, the agent has performed an action which leads to or results in the
flight of the ball, and the purposeful explanation of the ball's movement is
identical with and, thus, parasitic upon, the explanation of the pitcher's
action. In the case of NI, however, there is no earlier action. which produces its occurrence because NI is not caused by anything. And if it were
the causal result of an uncaused free mental action/1 the locus of libertarian
freedom would have been ch.anged22 and the question of the coherence of
FSC2 with respect to that action would arise all over again. 23
Third, and last,24 consider the example Stump uses to illustrate how a
mental act is correlated with a l1.eural sequence:
When I suddenly recognize my daughter's face across a crowded
room, that one mental act of recognition, which to me feels sudden or
even instantaneous, is correlated with many neural firings as information from the retina is sent through the optic nerve, relayed through
the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, processed in various
parts of the occipital cortex, which take account of figure, motion, orientation in space, and color, and then processed further in cortical
association areas. Only when the whole sequence of neural firings is
completed, do I have the mental act of recognizing my daughter. 25
It seems to me that an act of recognizing my daughter's face across a
crowded room is not an action. It is not something I do but something
which happens to me. Thus, even if Stump is correct about this mental
event requiring the occurrence of a whole sequence of neural events before
it occurs, this fact implies, little, if anything, about what occurs with mental
actions. A non-active mental happening such as a recognition does not
occur until the end of the neural process. A mental action such as a choice,
however, originates from me and is active from the outset. Thus, regardless of what happens at the end of the neural process which, by hypothesis,
is Jones' choice to vote for Reagan, if the sequence is not active from the
beginning (if NI itself is not active in nature), then there is no mental action
of choosing to vote for Reagan when N is completed.
Stump, however, would have us believe the very opposite. According
to her, NI is not an active mental event. Given that it is not, why should
we think that N itself of which NI is the initial part is an action once NL
occurs? After all, thougl1. NI is uncaused, it is not active in nature. Add
N2 to it, and there is now an undetermined but interl1.ally deterministic
sequence, but still no mental action. The same is the case with N3, and so
on. How can it be the case, however, that adding one more internally
determined event, NL, to the end of the chau1. of events transforms what
was not a mental action into something which is? It seems that all we have
at this point is Stump's word that this is what happens. The transforming
power of NL, however, seems thoroughly magical in nature. 26
I conclude that Stump's FSC2 is no more successful than her earlier one

STUMP ON LIBERTARIANISM AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

99

in undermining the truth of PAP. When a counterexample such as FSC2
against an intuitively plausible principle such as PAP requires the truth of
so many questionable and seemingly COllnterintuitive stipulations, one
cannot help continuing to assent to the intuitively plausible principle.
111
In addition to her Frankfurt-style argument against PAP, Sturnp claims that
the kind of 1:ibertarianism which denies the truth of PAP is more attractive
than the kind which endorses PAP because the latter is associated with
Cartesian dualism in a way that the former is not and, thereby, that the latter
is saddled with undesirable baggage that the former is not. Her reasoning in
support of this point seems to be that if a person is made of matter and the
falsity of Cartesian dualism is thereby guaranteed, then it is easier to accommodate FSCs which falsify PAP while still remaining a libertarian. 27
If we assume for the sake of argument that Stump is correct that the
species of libertarianism which affirms the truth of PAP also implies the
truth of Cartesian (substance) dualism, is there reason to think that that
form of libertarianism is false because of its implications with respect to
Cartesian dualism? In closing, I will briefly contend that there is no good
reason to believe that the answer to this question is 'Yes'. This is so for the
following reasons:
First, Cartesian dualism (as I understand it) claims that a choice is a simple mental event in the sense that it has no proper event parts of any kind
which comprise it. This simplicity, however, is not counterintuitive, and
Stump herself adn1its that a choice seems to its agent to be simple in this
way.28
Second, a Cartesian can maintain that a simple choice made by a
Cartesian soul can be correlated with a neural event because when an
agent chooses to perform an action, the cl10ice causes a neural event (in this
case, there would be a one-one relation).29 The choice itself, however, cannot be causally determined by any neural event or by anything else
because it cannot be determined, period. This does not imply that the
choice is unexplained because its agent makes it for a reason which is a
teleological explanation of that choice. 30
Stump maintains that there is a much stronger connection between
mind and brain than Cartesian dualism supposes. 31 At one point she
asserts that given the kinds of bodies and mental natures human beings
have, "the correlation between amental act or state and the firings of neurons must be a one-many relation."32 I have argued in Section 11 that she
has not presented a coherent libertarian account which presupposes such a
relation. Thus, Stump has not shown that a libertarian who affirms PAP
and a causal connection between the mind and the brain which is
Cartesian in natLlre is inadequate. 33 Until she provides some other argument to support her statements about the inadequacy of Cartesian dualism, her argument that PAP is false because of its association with
Cartesian dualism is unpersuasive. 34
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NOTES
1. Stewart Goetz, "Stumping for Widerker," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999):
83-89.
2. In this paper, I assume aversion of PAP which asserts that a person is
morally responsible for his choice, only if he could have chosen otherwise.
3. Eleonore Stump, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to
Goetz," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 413-422.
4. Ibid., p. 415.
5. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,"
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829-839.
6. David Widerker, "Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of
Decisions," Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995): 113-118; and "Libertarianism and
Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," Philosophical
Review 104 (1995): 247-261.
7. Stump, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," pp. 415416.
8. Ibid., p. 422, endnote 17.
9. It is relevant to note that Stump has changed her view about the relation between N and W, where the latter is the decision (choice) with respect to
which Jones is free. (Ibid., p. 419.) In her paper entitled "Libertarian Freedom
and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality,
ed. by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder [Lanham, MD: Rown1an &
Littlefield, 1996], pp. 73-88) to which I responded in "Stumping for Widerker,"
she claimed that neural events a, b, and c were causal predecessors of W. Now
she denies that they are causal predecessors.
10. Stump, "Dust, Determinisn1, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," p.418.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 417.
14. Ibid., pp. 418 and 419.
15. David Widerker originally made this point to me. Both of us would
acknowledge the mental act of beginning to choose only for the sake of discussion, because we believe that a choice is a simple mental action.
16. "Stumping for Widerker," p. 88.
17. Stump, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," p.419.
18. "[A]lthough amental act such as adecision may feel, subjectively, as if
it is simple ...." Ibid., p. 418. My only quarrel with Stump about the simplicity of adecision (choice) is that adecision does not feel simple. I have pointed
out elsewhere ["Libertarian Choice," Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): 197] that a
mental action such as a choice has no feel to it. Thus, an agent is just aware of a
choice's simplicity.
19. Stump says that "For those who think that mental states are identical
with neural states, ... the correlation between mind and brain has the implication that amental event is temporally extended throughout the microseconds it
takes for all the neurons in the correlated sequence to fire." ("Dust,
Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," pp. 421-422, endnote 16). But
if the mental event is temporally extended and identical with a complex neural
process, it is difficult to understand how it does not have an active or actional
beginning.
An anonymous referee stated that Stump explicitly denies the assumption
of identity between neural events and choices. As I pointed out in the second
paragraph of Section 11, however, Stump herself makes this assumption of
identity for purposes of illustration. In her earlier article ("Libertarian
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Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," p. 78), which I criticized ("Stumping for Widerker"), she explicitly states that FSCs are 'philosophy-of-mind-neutral' in the sense that they are compatible with both identity
and non-identity theories. Thus, on her view, even if choices are not identical
with temporally extended complex neural processes, they must be "strongly
correlated" ("Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," p. 419)
with them. Therefore, under the present alternative where a choice does not
occur only at TL when NL occurs, it will still be temporally extended and
seem to have an active beginning.
20. The helpfulness of this supposition was suggested to me by David
Widerker.
21. If it were the result of a determined action, the actual sequence would
involve determinism.
22. See my "Stumping for Widerker," p. 88.
23. Matters do not improve any for Stump's FSC2, if N is not identical with
W. This is because NI is still not an action and its occurrence is either permanently inexplicable if N is truncated before completion, or inexplicable until N
is completed and then it somehow becomes explicable in virtue of W's occurring (upon the completion of N) after it.
24. I owe this point to Tom Flint.
25. Ibid., p. 417.
26. I owe this point to Tom Flint.
27. "Does the claim that human beings sometimes act with moral responsibility and that morally responsible acts are indeterministic commit us to
accepting PAP? If human beings are made out of matter, then, in my view, the
answer is 'no'." Stun1p, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to
Goetz," p. 416.
28. It is worth quoting Stump again on this issue: "[A]lthough amental act
such as adecision may feel, subjectively, as if it is simple ...." Ibid., p. 418.
29. An anonymous referee stated that it is unclear why a Cartesian must
maintain that the causal relation is one-one in nature as opposed to one-many.
In the latter case, the choice causes a sequence of neural events, presumably
with no event in the sequence causing another event in that sequence in order
to avoid problems of causaloverdetermination. I do not believe that a
Cartesian must maintain a one-one causal relation, but I also do not see how
this issue is particularly relevant to the purposes of this paper. If there are
insuperable problems for a Cartesian one-one mental-to-neural causal relation,
I do not see how matters improve by asserting a one-many mental-to-neural
causal relation. If a Cartesian mental event cannot cause one neural event, I do
not see how it helps to multiply the number of neural events which it supposedly causes. Thus, for the sake of illustration (again following Stump's lead), I
discuss Cartesianisn1 in term of a one-one mental-to-neural causal relation.
30. See my "Libertarian Choice," pp. 195-211.
31. Stump, "Dust, Determinism, and Frankfurt: A Reply to Goetz," p. 415.
32. Ibid., p. 417.
33. I have argued elsewhere ("Dualism, Causation, and Supervenience,"
Faith and Philosophy 11 [1994]: 92-108) that the Cartesian dualist's claim that a
substantial soul causally interacts with its physical body is no more problematic than any non-dualist's view of the mental-physical relation.
34. Thanks to Tom Flint, Robert Kane, David Widerker and two anonymous referees for reading earlier drafts of this paper and making numerous
helpful suggestions.

